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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is by now an open secret that current interpretations of the 
meaning of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and of its relevance and mandate for contemporary problems 
of racial, gender, and economic justice, are deeply and, in a sense, 
hopelessly conflicted. The conflict, simply stated, is this: to the cur-
rent Supreme Court, 1 and to a sizeable and influential number of 
constitutional theorists,2 the "equal protection of the laws" guar-
anteed by the Constitution is essentially a guarantee that the cat-
egories delineated by legal rules will be "rational" and will be 
rationally related to legitimate state ends. To this group of jurists, 
the relevance of the equal protection clause to issues of racial justice 
rests on the important complementary minor premise to this guar-
antee of rationality: the claim, both descriptive and normative, that 
legislative distinctions based upon race can simply never be rational 
because there are no differences between the races that can in any 
way be relevant to state purposes, and, consequently, racial differ-
entiation in any context cannot be a legitimate state goal. 
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland B.A., J.D., University of Maryland; S.S.M., 
Stanford Law School. I would like to thank Michael Seidman and Carl Selinger for their helpful 
comments on the early drafts of this article. 
1. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). But see Metro Broadcasting, 
Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). 
2. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Comment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of 
Equality, 104 HARV. L. REv. 107 (1990). The classic statement of this position is Paul Brest, The 
Supreme Court 1975 Term Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1976). 
111 
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On this view, the equal protection clause is historically rooted 
in a constitutional and federal response to the pernicious slave laws, 
black codes, Jim Crow laws, and segregation mandates of southern 
states, all of which rested upon a specious and false theory of racial 
difference and hence upon pres1.J.mably "natural" distinctions be-
tween the slave and the freeman, the black man, and the white man 
to justify the different legal treatment and protections accorded them. 
From the historic repudiation of this false theory of racial difference 
and white superiority culminating in passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment - and from the further constitutional premise that cat-
egories must be rational - follows the important ethical and con-
stitutional mandate that the central meaning of the equal protection 
clause, and indeed of the Fourteenth Amendment in its entirety, is 
that the law must be colorblind. 
For a second group of jurists, including the liberal dissenters on 
the Court3 and a sizeable number of constitutional theorists in law 
schools,4 the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires not "rationality" in legislation but, rather, substantive 
justice. For this group the guarantee of equal protection is a con-
stitutional imperative for the states and Congress to take substantive 
steps toward the eradication of the unjust subordination of one group 
of citizens by another, including African-Americans and other peo-
ples of color by whites, women by men, and gays and lesbians by 
heterosexuals. On this view, the equal protection mandate and the 
Fourteenth Amendment is historically grounded not in the pernicious 
idea of racial difference but, rather, in the pernicious practice of 
racial subordination: the willful and continuing attempt of white 
people, with the willing acquiesence of state governments, to sub-
ordinate, deny, oppress, and use black people for their own ends. 
That subordination began with the enslavement of blacks by whites 
and their oppression through black codes and Jim Crow laws. The 
3. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 535 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Blackmun, J., 
dissenting); Metro Broadcasting Inc., 110 S. Ct. at 3011. 
4. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 
(1987); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1514-21 (2d ed. 1988); Ruth Colkcr, 
Anti- Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1986); 
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PlllL. PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). 
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subordination continues in our time through the use of purportedly 
"neutral" but in fact unjustified and exclusionary criteria that pre-
cludes entry of not only blacks, but also women and other people 
of color into the higher echelons of political, professional, educa-
tional, and economic life. The equal protection mandate for these 
theorists is a guarantee that either the states or, in the breach, Con-
gress will act to reverse these patterns of subordination. 
On this view, it most assuredly does not follow that the law must 
be "colorblind." Rather, the law must be sensitive and responsive 
to the very real and relevant differences that exist between both 
blacks and whites, women and men: differences in power, differ-
ences in status, and differing positions on the economic, social, and 
political hierarchies that comprise our public and private lives. The 
mandate of equal protection is minimally not to exacerbate those 
inequalities but, understood generously, the Fourteenth Amendment 
in general, and equal protection in particular, is a mandate to erad-
icate them. 
One purpose of this paper is to argue against both of these un-
derstandings of equal protection and to introduce a quite different 
interpretation - a view grounded in human nature and govern-
mental obligation held by the abolitionists of the early and mid-
nineteenth century. These abolitionists, at least according to a num-
ber of historians,5 propagated and popularized the phrase "equal 
protection of the law" in the decades immediately preceding the Civil 
War and the Reconstruction amendments. I will ultimately argue 
that this abolitionist understanding of equal protection, and of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is truer to both the plain language and the 
history of the Amendment than either the formal colorblind view 
or the substantive anti-subordination view briefly outlined above. 
Before doing so, however, I want to discuss in a little more detail 
the nature of the conflict between the two conceptions that dominate 
current case law and scholarship, why I think that conflict is quite 
distinctive in our constitutional jurisprudence, and suggest why it 
seems to me to be imperative that we somehow find a way to break 
5. See JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965); John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, 
The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421. 
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the deadlock. In the first section that follows, I will therefore discuss 
the schism in our current understanding of equal protection, and I 
will then introduce, by way of metaphor, the rather different ab-
olitionist understanding of the phrase "equal protection." In the 
next two sections, I will discuss modern applications of the aboli-
tionist understanding and structural and intellectual barriers to its 
modern implementation. . 
II. MODERN EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE 
The two interpretations of equal protection that dominate current 
law, which we might call "formal" and "anti-subordinationist," 
have in one form or another been present in judicial interpretations 
of the phrase from its genesis. However, it has only recently become 
clear how deeply incompatible these interpretations are and how 
thoroughly contradictory their implications. We can identify three 
modern phases in the evolution of the appearance of this contra-
diction. 
The first phase dates from Brown v. Board of Education6 up 
through the mid-seventies or so - roughly the period that saw the 
dismantling of Jim Crow laws and the integration of those southern 
public schools which had been intentionally segregated by state law. 
During this period, the contradiction between these two interpre-
tations was almost entirely invisible for the straightforward reason 
that both views were compatible with the integrationist ideal ex-
pressed and, to some degree, mandated in Brown. Under the formal, 
colorblind approach, Brown is correct and integration is required 
because the race-consciousness that is the central evil at which equal 
protection is aimed had manifested itself in segregation laws, of 
which segregated schooling was a part. To these jurists and thinkers, 
"separate but equal" was and is a cruel anomaly because the "sep-
arate" part of the "separate and equal" formula rested on, and 
was intended to communicate, a false claim of racial inferiority7 and, 
hence, inequality, and thus almost by definition could never yield 
6. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
7. Id. at 494. 
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equality. Thus, Plessy v. Ferguson8 is wrong, Brown right, and in-
tegration required. Under the anti-subordination approach as well, 
Brown is correct and integration required, not because segregation 
rested on a false view of racial difference, but because the subor-
dination of blacks by whites with state acquiescence and support, 
which was the central evil at which equal protection was aimed, had 
manifested itself in profoundly unequal schooling of black and white 
children, which had in turn furthered the subordination of black 
adults by whites, thus completing the circle.9 Integrating the schools 
is one way, certainly not the only way, and perhaps, in retrospect, 
not the best way to redress the inequality of an unequal and seg-
regated school system. Again, Plessy is wrong, Brown right, and 
integration required, not as a way to obliterate the root of a false 
racial theory of black inferiority but, rather, as a remedy of sub-
stantive inequality which happened to be manifested in segregated 
facilities. 
By the end of the Brown era, it was clear that these two inter-
pretations of both equal protection and of Brown itself were in fact 
different; they would yield divergent results in post-Brown cases re-
garding the extent of actual integration required by Brown of the 
states, rather than the mere cessation of state-ordered segregation. 10 
Nevertheless, these differences could be relegated to the margins. At 
the time of Brown, and for the most part during the post-Brown 
dismantling of Jim Crow laws, the two interpretations appeared to 
be in harmony. They both were consistent, although for different 
reasons, with the distinctive and specific mandate of Brown to in-
tegrate the schools, and, more loosely, with the integrationist vision 
of Martin Luther King, Ralph Abernathy, and the other civil rights 
leaders of the fifties and sixties for whom Brown was (and is) the 
institutional secular triumph of an often religious vision of racial 
harmony, integration, and brotherhood. 
8. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
9. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 935 (1989); David A. Strauss, The Myth of C%rblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REv. 99 (1986). 
10. Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) went the farthest 
toward requiring actual integretion, while Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) and Milliken v. 
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) went the farthest toward requiring only an end to intentional discrim-
ination. 
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The second phase of the evolution of this contradiction begins 
with Washington v. Davis in 1976.11 In Washington, the Court held 
that neutral criteria employed by states (or the District of Columbia) 
for the distribution of governmental benefits, and which dispro-
portionately and unjustifiably exclude blacks, are not unconstitu-
tional unless it can be shown that those employing the neutral criteria 
intended to discriminate against the injured group.12 In Davis, it 
became clear that the two interpretations of equal protection, in 
uneasy alliance through the dismantling of intentional discrimination 
accomplished during the post-Brown era, were in fact incompatible. 
For it is easy to see that under the formal understanding of equal 
protection, Davis is surely right: the evil at which equal protection 
is addressed - differential treatment by the state of blacks and 
whites, premised upon a false claim of racial difference and black 
inferiority - is not present. 13 The state is not treating the two groups 
differently; they are being treated the same, in a perfectly colorblind 
fashion. It is also easy to see, however, that under a substantive 
understanding of equal protection, Davis is profoundly, even trag-
ically, wrong. 14 The evil at which the equal protection clause is aimed 
- the unjustified subordination of blacks by whites by whatever 
means - was present in Davis, as well as in the wide range of state 
actions within its holding. Whites subordinate blacks (and men sub-
ordinate women) by the use of "neutral" criteria that, whether in-
tentionally or not, reflect white (or male) interests, histories, 
preferences, and aspirations, no less than by laws that explicitly treat 
the two groups differently on a theory of racial difference. If sub-
ordination, rather than a false claim of racial superiority, is the evil 
targeted by equal protection of the law, then Davis is simply wrong. 
A statute, regulation, or criterion that unjustifiably injures African-
Americans is no less subordinating than a statute which intentionally 
and differentially classifies. 
The irreducible conflict between these two interpretations during 
the Washington v. Davis era was clouded, however, for a reason 
11. 426 U.s. 229 (1976). 
12. Id. at 240. 
13. Id. at 246. See also Brest, supra note 2 (arguing that antidiscrimination is the general 
principle underlying equality law, not rectification of substantive inequalities). 
14. See TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1514-21. 
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that echoes the invisibility of the conflict during the Brown era. Just 
as both models proved compatible with the integrationist ideal ex-
pressed and mandated in Brown, although for very different reasons, 
similarly, both models proved compatible with the tort-like concep-
tion of constitutional responsibility assumed and furthered by Davis. 
In Davis, constitutional responsibility for implementing the mandate 
of equal protection took on the contours of a garden-variety tort: 
equal protection, under the model that came to the fore in Davis, 
simply means that the state is liable for harm that it causes to groups 
injured or burdened through its legislative classifications; liability 
accrues, however, only if the requisite tortious mental state is pres-
ent, just as individuals are liable in tort for harms caused to groups 
injured or burdened through their actions only if the requisite tor-
tious mental state is present. When filtered through this quasi-con-
stitutional-tort approach to equal protection, the difference between 
the formal and substantive understanding of equal protection is nar-
rowed to an almost technical difference over what requisite mental 
state is sufficient to trigger tort liability, rather than a fundamental 
difference in vision. For the formalist majority, something akin to 
specific intent to harm is clearly required;15 for the substantive, anti-
subordination minority, something much less is sufficient: general 
intent, recklessness, or perhaps negligence alone. Again, the differ-
ence is real and visible, but when viewed through the filter of the 
quasi-tort principles adopted or assumed in Davis, it appears to be 
a difference of degree. Both approaches seem to accept the overall 
picture of the equal protection clause as laying out duties for states 
not to harm their citizens in the same way that tort law spells out 
duties for citizens not to harm each other. The two models appear 
to differ only over the reach of the constitutional tort or, putting 
it differently, over the extent to which the conduct of states should 
be interfered with or regulated by the inhibiting force of consti-
tutional duty. 
The third phase in the evolution of the conflict between these 
two competing interpretations dates from the Supreme Court's de-
15. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 240. 
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cision in Croson v. City oj Richmond. 16 The Croson decision struck 
down, as violative of the equal protection clause, an affirmative-
action plan undertaken by the city of Richmond to rectify the sub-
ordinating effect of decades of systematic, institutional, and private 
discrimination against African-Americans. 17 In Croson and its af-
termath (continuing to the present), the full and explosive scope of 
the conflict between a formalist and an anti-subordinationist account 
of equal protection became fully apparent, as well as its origin in 
fundamentally different and incompatible conceptions of equality. 
To the formalist, including a majority of the current Court, race-
conscious affirmative action is clearly unconstitutional; it rests for 
its justification of the differential treatment of the races on a theory 
of racial difference (albeit socially, rather than biologically engen-
dered) and, therefore, violates the Fourteenth Amendment for the 
same reason as the Jim Crow laws of the late-nineteenth to mid-
twentieth centuries violate the Fourteenth Amendment.1s For the 
substantive anti-subordinationist, such a plan is not only clearly per-
mitted, but, as at least a number of such theorists have argued, may 
well be required: the plans reverse the utterly predictable effects of 
private, racial subordination which is precisely the target of the equal 
protection clause itself.19 
The scope and significance of this contrast should not be un-
derstated. Again, the difference is not simply that one group sees 
a constitutional violation where the other sees none or that one 
group reads the Constitution as prohibiting (x) where the other sees 
the Constitution as silent on (x), the standard form of constitutional 
disagreement. Rather, on this issue, while one group sees the Con-
stitution as prohibiting (x), the other sees the Constitution as not 
simply silent on (x) but as actually requiring it: the formalists see 
as prohibited by equal protection what the anti-subordinationists see 
as required by it. 
16. 488 u.s. 469 (1989). 
17. [d. at 480. 
18. [d. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the jUdgment). 
19. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 520-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Strauss, The 
Myth of C%rblindness, supra note 9. See Fried, supra note 2. 
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Thus, the two groups are reading the constitutional phrase not 
just as having differing scopes of reach but as mandating absolutely 
opposite obligations. It is not, to use an analogy, simply that one 
group reads the Constitution as requiring that we close the door 
while the second reads it as silent on the question; rather it is that 
one group reads the phrase as requiring that we close the door, while 
the second reads the phrase as requiring that we open it. It is for 
this reason that both groups can, with internal plausibility and co-
herence, accuse the other of Orwellian double-speak: of chiiming 
that war is peace. Professor Charles Fried, a fervent and eloquent 
advocate of a formalist view, thus accuses the modern anti-sub or-
dinationist approach (which he labels "collectivist") of using the 
equal protection clause, which was intended to combat racism, to 
promote it;20 he analogizes the modern anti-subordinationist position 
to that embraced by one of the most racist cases in our constitutional 
history: Plessy v. Ferguson.21 Similarly a number of anti-subordi-
nationists,22 myself included,23 have lamented the formalist insis-
tence, now made law by the Supreme Court, that the equal protection 
clause, intended to promote the eradication of the subordinating 
effects of racism, is now the weapon of those who would fight 
efforts to do precisely that. Again, from the anti-subordinationist 
perspective, the clause, while intended as a .tool to dismantle racism 
and inequality, is being used by formalists instead to promote such 
evils. 
Thus, what has only now become clear is that the formalist in-
terpretation of equal protection now embraced by the Supreme Court 
and the anti-subordinationist interpretation endorsed by the Court's 
20. See Fried, supra note 2, at 111. 
21. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
22. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
with whom Brennan, J., and Blackmun, J., join, dissenting); Kenneth Casebeer, Running on Empty: 
Justice Brennan's Plea, The Empty State, the City of Richmond, and the Profession, 43 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 989 (1989); Richard Delgado, On Taking Back Our Civil Rights Promises: When Equality 
Doesn't Compute, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 579; Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action 
and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729 (1989); Strauss, Dis-
criminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, supra note 9; Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: 
An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2128 (1989). 
23. Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REv. 641, 669-
72 (1990). 
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dissenters and academic critics are not simply different and equally 
plausible interpretations of a concededly vague constitutional phrase 
- a phrase inevitably, and perhaps intentionally, open to multiple 
claims of meanings. The problem is not simply that one view is 
somewhat broader or narrower than the other, such that what is 
constitutional under the first interpretation is unconstitutional under 
the second, or vice versa; nor is the problem that under the first 
view the constitution forbids what under the second view it permits. 
Rather, the contrast between these two understandings of equal pro-
tection is more fundamental than that: under the first view, the 
Constitution forbids what under the second it seems to require, not 
simply permit: race-conscious, state, city, or congressionally-initiated 
affirmative action designed to undo the effects of wide-scale private 
and quasi-private subordination of African-American citizens. The 
affirmative action problem has thus fully exposed the fundamental 
contradiction between these two interpretations of the nature of the 
equality mandated by the equal protection clause. The color-blind-
ness required by the phrase, according to the formalists, is pro-
foundly incompatible with the affirmative actions necessary to 
eradicate subordination, the nub of the same phrase, according to 
the anti-subordinationists. 
Furthermore, the protestations of theorists from both camps not-
withstanding, neither position can be decisively refuted by reference 
to either the language or history of the phrase, nor by reference to 
fundamental, unassailable principles of political morality. It is surely 
possible to understand "equal protection of the laws" as requiring 
of the state a "blindness" to the race of its citizens. How better to 
rectify an historical unwillingness to protect citizens of a particular 
color than by insisting that state legislators be blind to such factors? 
Requiring, in effect, that legislators don John Rawls' veil of 
ignorance24 with respect to all racial characteristics, whatever the 
circumstance, whatever the motive. It is impossible not to concede 
(or insist) that the formalists' insistence on colorblindness is not out 
of line with the language and history of the phrase. Nor, for that 
matter, is it out of line with at least one dominant theme of Western 
24. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971). 
HeinOnline -- 94 W. Va. L. Rev. 121 1991-1992
1991] ABOLITIONIST INTERPRETATION 121 
liberal thought, at least since the American Civil War - to wit, 
that it is our status as human beings that renders us worthy and 
entitled to protection by the state, and we do not lose that entitle-
ment by virtue of racial, gender, or ethnic characteristics. 
It also seems incontrovertible, however, that the framers of the 
Amendment intended to rectify and reverse the subordination of 
African-Americans effectuated by over a century of slavery and that 
"equal protection of the law" can be read as requiring affirmative 
efforts to do precisely that. Similarly, it is not at all implausible to 
argue that principles of compensatory and distributive justice require 
any decent liberal society to undertake action that ameliorates rather 
than exacerbates the substantive inequalities still endured by those 
living with the legacy of that past. Thus, the same constitutional 
phrase, no matter what the interpretive methodology used, can seem-
ingly be read so as to require diametrically opposed obligations. If 
we view the Constitution as imposing mandatory obligations, as we 
surely should, we have a huge problem: it seems to require of us 
a massive contradiction, a classic case of impossibility. If the Con-
stitution were a contract, we would void the phrase. 
Although, as I will argue in a moment, it may be a mistake, it 
is surely neither cynical, nihilist, or even overly skeptical to infer 
from this example of the confusion caused by the equal protection 
clause that which has been urged in the last fifteen years by large 
numbers of critical legal scholars: that the Constitution has no pre-
given, "already present" meaning awaiting discovery by fair-minded 
readers of the document.25 The presence of flagrantly contradictory 
mandates emanating from the same constitutional phrase seems to 
perfectly insubstantiate the central "indeterminacy claim" of the 
deconstructionist wing of the critical legal studies movement: that 
the law in general, and certainly the phrases of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in particular, are so radically indeterminant that they 
should be viewed as nothing more than repositories of the pre-formed 
and arbitrarily embraced political commitments of our utterly cha-
25. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE (1988). 
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otic selves - "selves" and "political commitments" that are formed 
essentially randomly. Those selves and commitments cannot be 
formed or even influenced by the meanings of the given texts of 
our culture for the simple reason that there are no meanings or any 
given texts to have such an influence.26 When formalists and sub-
stantive anti-subordinationists see in the equal protection clause di-
ametrically opposed mandates, they are simply reading into that 
phrase their own political commitments: again, an essentially ar-
bitrarily-chosen-from, one-or-another conception of equality as the 
best means of organizing social life. From this realization it is just 
a short step to the conclusion that the constitutional phrase itself 
(as well as its history) is serving as, at most, an anachronistic plead-
ing requirement, and that we would all be better off if we simply 
dispensed with the requirement and proceeded, so to speak, directly 
"to the merits" of the underlying debate: whether we should or 
should not rectify the subordination of African-Americans through 
affirmative action - whether we should or should not insist on a 
colorblind state as a matter of political morality. To be blunt, the 
Constitution, its supposed plain meaning, and its uncontested history 
(to say nothing of its contested history) have nothing to teach us. 
The Constitution is at best a vehicle, and a clumsy vehicle at that, 
for political argument; it neither constrains the substance nor adds 
anything of value to what we would say in its absence. 
Make no mistake about it, there is something undeniably lib-
erating, even intoxicating, in freeing oneself and political debate 
from the constraints of constitutional text and the political history 
that the text tenuously records and celebrates. The political history 
of the United States that culminated and is reflected in the consti-
tutional text is in large measure a history of almost unthinkable 
brutality toward slaves, genocidal hatred of Native Americans, racist 
devaluation of non-whites and non-white cultures, sexist devaluation 
of women, and a less than admirable attitude of submissiveness to 
the authority of unworthy leaders in all spheres of government and 
public life. Why should we bind or constrain our political argument, 
26. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 
STAN. L. REv. 591, 597 (1981). 
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to say nothing of our political choices, by the texts produced by 
this history of ruthlessness, of brutality, and of mindless, infantile, 
and at times, psychotic, numbing wrath? Surely a part of the motive, 
if not the sole motive, behind affirmation of the indeterminacy thesis 
among critical legal theorists (unlike, it is worth noting, among crit-
icalliterary theorists) is a desire to expand the scope of our current 
political and constitutional imagination beyond not so much the false 
constraints, but rather beyond the pernicious constraints of a less 
than admirable past. 
There are, however, serious problems with the critical scholars' 
aspiration of atextuality and ahistoricity, this urge to shed an ignoble 
history. First, of course, it may simply not be possible - or at least 
it has been the burden of a great deal of recent neo-pragmatist and 
literary-legal scholarship to so claim.27 Our "selves" and our po-
litical dispositions are far from being the chaotic, randomly chosen 
bundles of inclinations insisted upon by at least some advocates of 
the indeterminacy thesis; in fact, our "selves" and political dis-
positions may be exhaustively constituted by precisely the history, 
with all its horrors, ambiguities, and contradictions that we aim, 
through claims of indeterminacy, to shed. 
The second problem (and to my mind the more telling) with the 
atextual and ahistoric aspirations of the indeterminacy thesis is that 
the history and text being shed, although no doubt in large part a 
succession of waves of brutality and oppression, may also contain 
moments of real nobility and courage, and the text that is the cul-
mination of those moments may embody and express part of a pro-
foundly moral social vision. If we turn our backs on history and 
text, in short, we may be turning our backs on imaginings more 
worthy than our own. The Fourteenth Amendment, in fact, may be 
just such a text; its passage may have been just such a moment, 
and its normative implications just such a vision. If we abandon 
27. See, e.g., Symposium on the Renaissance oj Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 
s. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist 
Legal Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989); Catherine W. Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual 
Tradition: The Pragmatism oj Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 541 (1988). 
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the history and text of the Fourteenth Amendment as possible guides 
to at least its possible meanings, whether or not those meanings 
exhaust the possibilities and whether or not we should regard them 
as "authoritative," we may be abandoning a source of moral insight 
and a vision of the just society that is superior to those visions our 
current ahistoric and parochial "selves" have managed to envision. 
Let me just put the point autobiographically: my reason for em-
barking on this project is that the vision of a just society expressed 
by the equal protection clause, and advocated by some of its pro-
ponents, may be superior to both the formalist and anti-subordi-
nationist understandings of the phrase that dominate current debate 
and case law. Even if we assume, or insist, that the intended meaning 
should not be regarded as the only possible meaning - that there 
may have been several and conflicting intended meanings, and that 
the historical meaning carries no modern legal mandate - the pos-
sibility that the originally intended meaning is normatively superior 
to modern interpretations is surely a sufficient reason to reacquaint 
oneself with the text and origins of the constitutional text. The in-
determinacy theorists' usually implicit and sometimes explicit sug-
gestion might at least on occasion be false: that although the 
appearance of contradiction <:ounsels the abandonment of text and 
history, that need not be viewed as troubling in the case of legal 
and constitutional texts because the text being abandoned is for the 
most part the recordation of a violent and oppressive history, which 
not only cannot, but also should not, constrain modern moral and 
political imagination. In the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, this 
argument seems to me to be false: the vision expressed in the Amend-
ment, and advocated by some of its proponents, is stronger than 
both the formalist and anti-subordinationist position that dominate 
modern debate, or at least I will so argue. 
There is one other purely pragmatic and explicitly political reason 
for seeking out a new paradigm of meaning for the equal protection 
clause. The affirmative action debate in this culture, I think, has 
come to a dead-end. Like the debate over abortion, the affirmative 
action debate has reached the point where further persuasion is not 
_ possible. That fact alone is unfortunate enough, but it is doubly 
tragic if, as a consequence of that impasse, the evolution of our 
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understanding of the equal protection clause to say nothing of the 
application of the clause, ceases: if because of the impasse over af-
firmative action, the equal protection clause ceases to become, in 
effect, a part of the living Constitution. That may well happen, if 
it has not happened already. The formalist objection to affirmative 
action may be an unanswerable objection to an anti-subordinationist 
view of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the anti-subordination 
objection to viewing the Fourteenth Amendment as a limit to af-
firmative action may be an unanswerable objection to the formal, 
colorblind interpretation of its mandate. If so, then neither side, in 
effect, can move past affirmative action: it is the end of the debate, 
the end of reasoned discussion, the end of constitutional progress. 
It may be time, in effect, to start over, to go back to the beginning, 
and to construct a new paradigm. It may be time, in other words, 
to change the subject. 
III. TOWARD AN ABOLITIONIST UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
In a recent, remarkable essay entitled The Rule of Law as a Law 
of Rules,28 Justice Antonin Scalia describes the basic idea behind the 
formalist interpretation of the equal protection clause by use of an 
analogy to family life, and as patriarchically offensive as the idea 
of such an analogy may initially appear to be, a contrasting familial 
analogy may be the best way to describe the basic idea behind the 
abolitionist interpretation as well. Children, Scalia opines, can endure 
all sorts of rules that limit their freedom; in fact, although he does 
not say as much, children need and thrive on such rules. What they 
absolutely cannot and will not endure are rules that are unequally 
applied. A curfew for a fifteen year old is tolerable. What is not 
tolerable is that a younger sibling must abide by a curfew even though 
an older sibling, at the same age and therefore similarly situated, 
did not.29 Restriction to one's room or house is a tolerable punish-
ment, but only if all who did the crime must do the time. A parent 
who breaks this sacred covenant (and, let's face it, it happens fre-
28. Antonin Scalia, The Rule oj Law as a Law oj Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175, 1178 (1989). 
29. [d. 
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quently) will find herself or himself faced with the fury of a child 
who feels herself to be, and who in fact is, suffering a fundamental, 
incomprehensible, unspeakable injustice. A similar scenario can be 
seen with regard to the equal protection clause. Citizens will not 
tolerate breaches of formal equality any more than will children. 
Rules must be even-handedly applied to all; departures from this 
norm must be grounded in well-reasoned distinctions. 
Scalia's metaphor has no doubt accurately captured the nub of 
a requirement of formal, equal justice. Formal, equal justice requires 
that rules be applied evenhandedly to all similarly situated persons 
within the scope of the rule. But as noble or central as the ideal of 
formal justice may be, the Fourteenth Amendment does not speak 
of equal justice; it speaks of equal protection. Perhaps, then, a better 
familial analogy for understanding the mandate of equal protection 
might be this: imagine not the Partridge family, with generally well-
behaved children who occasionally must be punished and with gen-
erally well-intentioned parents who occasionally lapse from the norm 
of equal justice. Instead, imagine an island with children who are 
more along the lines of those portrayed by William Golding in his 
horrific dystopia Lord oj the Flies.30 On this island, the children have 
three basic instincts: to survive, to attain personal glory, and to dom-
inate. They generally achieve the first two ends by cooperatively con-
verting the island's natural bounty into food and shelter through their 
labor, and then engaging in the competitive acquisition, alienation, 
barter, trade, and ownership of various goods. In their spare time, 
and because they are nasty and aggressive creatures, they engage in 
fistfights, inflicting as much damage as possible on each other, all 
toward the end of establishing not just comparative glory, but actual 
physical dominance over each other. 
Further imagine, however, that on this island, unlike on Gold-
ing's, there are parents present, and that these parents are a central 
authority whom the children generally obey on fear of sanctions if 
they do not. The parents on this Golding-esque island, though, are 
peculiar. They usually intervene in their children's economic lives to 
30. WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES (1962). 
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ensure that promises are kept, so that all the children can withstand 
natural threats to survival and have equal opportunities in the quest 
for glory. In addition, the parents intervene in their children's phys-
ical battles to protect each child against the violence and ,dominance 
of the others. They accomplish this latter goal by laying down a 
mandate prohibiting all intra-familial violence and then punishing 
offenders. But for some perverse reason, they bestow this protection 
of parental authority on every child but one. Whether through ne-
glect, sadism, or complicity, the parents consistently deny the pro-
tection to one of the siblings that they grant to the others. 
The consequence of the denial of parental protection against pri-
vate sibling violence and betrayal to one child but not the others -
this denial of equal protection - is not simply the sufferance of 
unequal justice, although it is assuredly in part that. It is more per-
vasive, more disabling, and more insidious. The child denied equal 
protection of the parental authority, no less than the citizen denied 
equal protection of the state authority against private violence and 
violation, lives a very different life than her siblings. The child, who 
alone must endure the violence of the others and isolation from the 
economic life of the community, all with no recourse or remedy, in 
effect becomes the slave, subject, or subordinate of the other children 
against whom she has no rights. Put differently, because she has no 
rights against them, because she lacks parental protection, she be-
comes the object of the other childrens' will. The potential unchecked 
violence and material deprivation which she will endure if she dis-
obeys their commands will instill in her, if there is no escape, a 
pattern of obedience, submission, and subordination. One way to 
express the difference between her life and the lives of the other 
children is that the other children live with only one familial au-
thority: the parents whose will must be obeyed, against whom they 
have no rights and against whose violence there is no recourse. The 
child denied equal protection, by contrast, lives under the thumb of 
two sovereigns: the parents and the violent siblings who become, no 
less than the parents, an authority who must be obeyed: the source 
of commands that must be followed. She becomes not just a victim 
of injustice. She becomes a slave. 
This scenario, the family that denies equal protection, rather than 
simply equal justice, is harder to imagine than the first because, while 
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loving parents may occasionally (even often) lapse from the ideal of 
equal justice, loving parents (and most parents are loving) do not 
even on occasion deny equal protection. The instinct to protect and 
to parent S1Ie too inextricably intertwined to expect these sorts of 
lapses in judgment or fairness, although it does sometimes happen; 
think of the younger sibling who suffers, and who is allowed by the 
parents to suffer, from sexual violation and abuse inflicted by a 
family relative. But generally, parents do not deny to any of their 
children their protection against the violence of their siblings or, to 
the extent possible, of their peers. States, however - the intuitive 
appeal of Scalia's patriarchal metaphor notwithstanding - are not 
families, and governments are not loving parents. States do from 
time to time withhold protection against private violence and private 
violation from a citizen or group of citizens. What then is the con-
sequence when they do? 
If the denial is complete, sweeping, and universal in scope, if the 
state utterly refuses to protect one group against the organized vi-
olence and violations of trust of a second, such that the violence is 
real and the threat of violation and betrayal is always credible, a 
not unexpected outcome is the institution of slavery itself. Indeed, 
the master-slave relationship can be defined, and often has been de-
fined,31 as a private relationship in which the violent assault by the 
master of the slave is not a criminal offense (but not vice versa), 
such that the assaulted slave has no recourse against the assaultive 
master, no rights that were violated. And, in a market economy, the 
withdrawal of the state's assurance that priyate trusts will not be 
violated, of course, leaves the slave unprotected against natural threats 
to survival, just as the withdrawal of the state's protection against 
private violence leaves the slave unprotected against physical threats. 
Unlike the citizen who is protected against such violence" betrayal, 
and violation, the only way for the slave to avoid the violence of 
the master or the threat of starvation attendant to his betrayal and 
violations of trust is for the master's command to be obeyed, his 
will to be accommodated. This denial of protection against the vi-
31. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 11, 77 (1975). 
HeinOnline -- 94 W. Va. L. Rev. 129 1991-1992
1991] ABOLITIONIST INTERPRETA TION 129 
olence and violation of a master is what defines, to say nothing of 
legitimizes, the master-slave relationship. 
Once that relationship is established, one way to express the dif-
ference between the slave and the citizen is this: the citizen lives under 
the rule of only one sovereign - the state - while the slave lives 
under the rule of at least two sovereigns - the state and the master 
- the commands of both to be endured under the threat of un-
checked violence. The citizen must abide by the commands of the 
state if he wishes to avoid its violent sanctions, but must not abide 
the commands of any other. He is protected by the state and more 
specifically by its criminal law against all non-state violence; this 
protection is certainly a part of what it means to have rights. The 
slave, in marked contrast, must abide by the commands of two sov-
ereigns, the state and the master, if he wishes to avoid violence or 
deprivation; this is what it is to be denied the protection of the state's 
law. Where one citizen, but not others, is denied protection, then 
protection is obviously unequal. The inequality of protection, unlike 
the unequal application of general laws decried by Scalia, gives rise 
not only to the evil of formal injustice but to the much more con-
crete, pervasive, and pernicious evil of slavery. 
The message that I suggest we should take from the island met-
aphor is that the plainest possible meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment mandate that no state shall deny to any citizen "equal protection 
of the law" is that no state may deny to any citizen the protection 
of its criminal and civil law against private violence and private vi-
olation. Put differently, no state may, through denials of protection, 
permit any citizen to live in a state of "dual sovereignty." The equal 
protection clause on this reading is at root a guarantee not of equal 
justice nor of substantive equality, but of sole sovereignty: the state, 
and only the state, shall be sovereign over each and every citizen. 
Only the state shall have access to the use of unchecked and un-
checkable violence to effectuate its will (and then, of course, only 
with due process). No citizen shall be subject to uncheckable violence 
by anyone other than the state;. no citizen shall be under the will 
and command of anyone other than the state. Inversely, no entity, 
no individual, no group, no race, no gender, and no class other than 
the state shall have recourse to uncheckable violence as a means of 
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effectuating his, her, or its will. No one other than the state shall 
have the power, backed by the credible threat of violence, to com-
mand and dominate the will of others. The equal protection clause 
is thus a guarantee of sole state sovereignty. Any relationship of 
sovereignty between a subject and master, other than that between 
state and citizen, that exists through state acquiescence - a refusal 
of the state to deter the credible threat of violence on which sov-
ereignty depends - is evidence that the state has violated this guar-
antee of protection. 
Although the master-slave relationship is the most logical out-
come of a massive, universal, blanket denial of the protection of the 
law to one group of persons, the traditional relationship of slavery, 
with its economic meaning and consequences, is not the only possible 
outcome, for at least two reasons. First, it may be that the privileged, 
sovereign citizen in a state characterized by the denial of equal pro-
tection to others does not want the subject's labor, but, rather, wants 
something else. Perhaps he only wants from the subject class a gen-
eral pattern of obedience, acquiescence, and subservience. Perhaps, 
rather than labor, he wants something very different from the un-
protected subject, such as her sexuality, 32 a theme to which I will 
return. 
But the economic relationship of master and slave may not be 
the outcome of a massive denial of equal protection for a rather 
different reason that brings us directly to the history of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Enslavement may not be the result of a denial 
of equal protection if slavery itself, but not the unequal protection 
of the law which facilitates and defines it, has been outlawed. If 
only slavery is outlawed, but not the denial of equal protection of 
the laws which is its logical underpinning, then it would not be 
surprising if the result of the prohibition of slavery was the sub-
servience, acquiescence, and obedience of the subject, even if not 
formally enslaved, class. Indeed, in the post-Thirteenth Amendment 
and pre-Fourteenth Amendment world, the pattern of subservience, 
32. This is the general thesis of Catherine MacKinnon's work. See, e.g., CATHERINB A. 
MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); CATHRINB A. MACKINNON, 
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989). 
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acquiescence, and obedience of the freed slaves to the commands, 
will, desires, or values of whites, all grounded in a fully justified 
fear of unchecked violence and unchecked violations of trust, was 
the clearest evidence one could possibly require that the states had 
denied to one class of its citizens the equal protection of the law. 
In his powerful and justly influential book The Antislavery Or-
igins oj the Fourteenth Amendment,33 first published in the early 
fifties, and re-released in the mid-sixties, Professor Jacobus tenBroek 
of the University of California argued that precisely this under-
standing of the phrase "equal protection of the law" was the un-
derstanding of the clause held by many of the Amendment's framers: 
that the state must guarantee its "sole sovereignty" to each citizen 
and must accordingly protect each citizen against the threat of both 
private violence and private violation. Simply put, tenBroek's history 
suggests that this was the understanding the abolitionists and their 
supporters, from the 1830's through passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, embraced, pleaded, propagandized, and advocated -
the claim that every state must guarantee to every citizen the "equal 
protection of the laws."34 The abolitionists, above all else, under-
stood that it was precisely a denial of the protection of the state 
against private violence and private violation of trust that facilitated 
and even defined the status of the slave. After the passage of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, it became apparent to the abolitionists, their 
advocates, and fellow travelers in Congress that although a denial 
of equal protection is a necessary condition of slavery, eradication 
of slavery is not tantamount to a guarantee of equal protection. The 
wave of Ku Klux Klan violence of whites against blacks and abo-
litionists, the refusal of the southern states (and in many instances 
the northern states), to punish, check, or deter that violence, and 
the states' refusal to extend to the freed slaves the legal forms of 
contract and property that were essential to their participation in 
the community's economic life, which was in turn the only genuine 
protection against natural threats to survival, engendered precisely 
the relationship of sovereign and subject, dominance and subser-
33. JACOBUS TENBROEK, supra note 5, at 4 (now re-titled: EQUAL UNDER LAW). 
34. [d. at 116-134. 
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vience, command and obedience, which the unchecked violence and 
violation of one group against another can predictably insure.3s One 
could not have more vivid proof that the formal abolition of slavery 
will not necessarily guarantee the sole sovereignty of the state, and 
hence the true "citizen's equality," promised by the phrase "equal 
protection of the law." 
Thus, the need for yet another amendment: one outlawing not 
just the symptom of slavery but the disease itself - the denial of 
the protection of the state against private violence and violation, of 
which slavery is one, but only one, possible manifestation. The equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was thus intended 
by the abolitionists, and at least some of its proponents, to abolish 
not only slavery per se,36 but also the "dual sovereignty" which 
facilitates it; such "dual sovereignty" which in turn is engendered 
by a state's refusal to grant to one group of its citizens protection 
of the law against private violence, economic isolation, and viola-
tion, and which leaves citizens profoundly and thoroughly unequal. 
As far as I can tell, this particular history is not controversial; 
indeed, this can fairly be called the uncontested meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Given the degree of discord among legal 
theorists regarding the meaning of the equal protection clause, it is, 
at first blush, somewhat remarkable that there is such widespread 
consensus among historians, including those same legal theorists when 
wearing their "historian" hats, that this abolitionist meaning, or 
something closely akin to it, is the meaning of the equal protection 
clause which was embraced by those who most actively campaigned 
for its inclusion in the Constitution, from the 1830's all the way 
through the passage of the Amendment itself. Indeed, that this ab-
olitionist understanding was precisely the meaning intended by the 
Fourteenth Amendment's most influential framers is often given as 
an argument by both intentionalists - against modern, supposedly 
broader, interpretations of the clause, such as that embraced by the 
Warren Court in Brown37 - and anti-intentionalists - as a defin-
35. [d. at 201-39. 
36. [d. 
37. This argument has its origins in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, (1873), 
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itive reductio ad absurdum argument against intentionalist modes of 
constitutional interpretation: if that is what the phrase meant his-
torically, then history just cannot matter all that much, because 
whatever it means today, it means something much broader than 
that. For example, Richard Posner has argued against Robert Bork's 
intentionalism that no one, including Bork himself, can truly be an 
intentionalist regarding the equal protection clause because it is clear 
that all the equal protection clause was intended to do was to insure 
that freed slaves would no longer be denied the protection of the 
state against Klan violence. Given that fact, under a truly inten-
tionalist approach to constitutional meaning, Brown is surely wrong. 
Why? Because ensuring protection against Klan violence obviously 
has nothing to do with school segregation or desegregation. How-
ever, Brown, for whatever reason, is not surely wrong; in fact, it 
is surely right, a conclusion with which Bork himself does not quar-
rel. Therefore, Posner concludes, quod erat demonstrandum, neither 
Bork nor any other Brown sympathizer can possibly be an inten-
tionalist.38 
In a moment, I want to argue that Posner's view represents a 
cramped understanding of the abolitionist position, as well as of 
intentionalism. I disagree with Posner's implied charge that under 
an abolitionist approach, the Fourteenth Amendment has no modern 
content because there simply are no modern analogues to either slav-
ery or the unchecked Klan violence and private violation of freed 
slaves that triggered the passage of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. It is actually remarkably easy to find modern ex-
amples of the states' denial to one group of citizens of the protection 
of criminal and civil law against private violence and violation. In 
fact, in the next section, I will suggest five such modern applications. 
First, I will contrast this "abolitionist" understanding of the core 
in which Justice Miller, in the course of holding that a Louisiana law granting a corporation monopoly 
status does not violate the Constitution, opined that the Reconstruction Amendments in their entirety 
were intended to ensure "the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that 
freedom, and the protection of the newly made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those 
who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him." [d. at 407. See generally RAOUL BERGER, 
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) (arguing 
generally against Warren Court interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, as outside the perimeters 
of its intended meaning). 
38. Richard A. Posner, Bark and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1365 (1990). 
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guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment with the understanding of 
the history of the Amendment relied upon by formalists and anti-
subordinationists, respectively. 
If the abolitionist understanding is right, then the formalist in-
sistence on a colorblind Constitution simply understates by half the 
nature of the evil at which the Fourteenth Amendment is aimed. 
Slavery was indeed bolstered by a false and invidious theory of racial 
difference and racial inferiority, as was the subordination facilitated 
by the denials of equal protection that followed its abolition. But 
that theory of racial difference is surely not all that is wrong with 
either the enslavement or the sup ordination of African-Americans 
in the nineteenth century. Otherwise, it would be a complete re-
sponse to the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, assuming for 
a moment that there had been no Thirteenth Amendment, to insist 
upon a colorblind system of slavery, to concede, so to speak, that 
there is indeed a "bad" form of slavery that rests on a false theory 
of racial difference, but if we abandon that false theory, and just 
enslave "natural slaves" without regard to their race, the institution 
is "rational," and thus constitutional, because it no longer falsely 
categorizes people on the basis of irrelevant racial characteristics. 
Colorblind slavery, in other words, is fully constitutional under the 
interpretation of the equal protection clause put forward by for-
malists. But surely it is peculiar to think that colorblind slavery, 
unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment, is not a violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as well. Indeed, it is not only pe-
culiar, it is absurd. Yet it is precisely this absurdity to which the 
formalist interpretation leads us. A colorblind institution of slavery 
would still be both slavery in its purest form and a denial of equal 
protection to one group, the slaves, against the private violence of 
the other group, the masters. This would be true not only because 
there are no "natural slaves" such that the categories, no matter 
how drawn, could never be rational, but also because the thing itself, 
the slave, is not a category that even exists in nature: it is one half 
of a relationship, and it is defined by precisely that which the Four-
teenth Amendment explicitly prohibits: the unequal protection of 
law. However the categories are drawn, whether color conscious or 
colorblind, slavery is a violation of the Fourteenth no less than the 
Thirteenth Amendment because it evidences a massive denial of the 
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equal protection of the law. Colorblindness, although perhaps a con-
dition of formal, equal justice, is simply not the nub of equal pro-
tection. Rather, protection is. 
More generally, any state of "dual sovereignty," whether or not 
it results in economic slavery, is a violation of equal protection, 
regardless of whether the distinctions between superior and inferior, 
sovereign and subject, dominant and subordinate, are drawn in a 
colorblind fashion or along lines that track any other so-called sus-
pect class. If we return for a moment to the hypothetical family or 
the small scale society on the Golding-esque island, even if the sub-
servient class from whom the protection of the parent or state is 
denied is divined in a perfectly rational or perfectly random fashion, 
in a way that is utterly blind to race, gender, ethnicity, or religion, 
even if the subject and master classes are composed of perfectly 
representative cross-sections of every "suspect class" imaginable 
(some are old, some young, some black, some white, some women, 
some men, some gays, some straights, etc.), the result would still 
be a denial of equal protection. One group, the ethnically, racially, 
sexually diverse subject group, is denied the protection of the law 
granted the other group. The result is that the subject group lives 
under the rule of two sovereigns, the state and the other group. This 
result obviously holds regardless of the composition of either class. 
The moral is simply that rational categorization, no less than the 
colorblind mandate that is implied by the requirement of rationality, 
is not the nub of equal protection. Protection is the nub of equal 
protection. The state must protect, and it must protect equally. 
If this abolitionist understanding of equal protection is correct, 
then the problem with the anti-subordinationist interpretation of equal 
protection is clear: just as the formalist approach only addresses a 
part of the evil, the anti-subordinationist account overstates the evil. 
The nub of equal protection is surely not rationality or colorblind-
ness, but neither is 'it substantive equality. Again, the nub is pro-
tection. Just as the formalist interpretation seems to imply the 
constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of a colorblind 
institution of slavery, and therefore seems under-inclusive, so the 
anti-subordinationist interpretation seems to imply the unconstitu-
tionality of an incredibly over-inclusive array of inequalities, whether 
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or not the product of the dual sovereignty forbidden by the guar-
antee of equal protection. The state's failure to rectify and reverse 
virtually any unequal distribution of power, not just between whites 
and blacks or women and men but between anybody and anybody, 
so long as the underlying cause of the inequality is a factor which 
is or should be morally irrelevant, would, on this view, be a denial 
of equal protection and therefore be unconstitutional. One need not 
be a libertarian or a free marketeer to see that this would be an 
unattractive world in which to live. About thirty years ago, Kurt 
Vonnegut,39 no regressive neo-conservative he, described a fictional 
and dystopic world in which buzzers go off in the inner ears of 
persons of exceptional intelligence, talented dancers wear weights, 
singers have their vocal chords scarred, and tall people learn to 
slump so as not to be intimidating on the basketball court, all in 
the name of a vision of equality that is very hard to differentiate 
from the anti-subordinationist approach. A world in which all have 
equal power would be a world not only free of the malign ine-
qualities that stem from the states' failure to protect, but also free 
of the far broader array of benign inequalities and differences that 
constitute not just our own, but virtually any social world. The anti-
subordinationist understanding of equal protection, when severed 
from the focus on the states' duty to provide protection, is fatally 
vague and over-general. If what is prohibited by equal protection 
is truly any and all "subordination" that stems from inequalities in 
power which themselves are rooted in morally insignificant deter-
minants, then it seems that what is prohibited is simply sociallife.40 
Finally, from an abolitionist perspective, it is clear that both the 
formalist and the anti-subordinationist models are partial truths. A 
false racial theory of black difference and black inferiority is indeed 
the target of the Fourteenth Amendment when that false theory is 
used to justify the states' withdrawal of its protection from blacks 
and thereby facilitate the enslavement or subordination of blacks to 
the will of whites. But the cure for that evil is surely not "color-
39. KURT VONNEGUT, Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO TIlE MONKEY HOUSE (2d ed. 1988). 
40. Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (arguing that a Rawlsian view 
of justice does not adequately respect individuals' rights to the fruits of their natural endowments). 
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blindness." A false racial theory is not necessary to such subor-
dination. And subordination of blacks by whites (or women by men) 
is indeed the target of the Fourteenth Amendment when that sub-
ordination is the consequence of a system of dual sovereignty oc-
casioned by the states' withdrawal of its protection against private 
violence or violation from one group of citizens. But the cure for 
that evil is not the eradication of all inequalities of power. 
For all their differences, the formalist and anti-subordinationist 
interpretations of the equal protection clause share one feature, and 
it is what they share which renders them both problematic: they are 
both interpretations, albeit conflicting ones, of equality, rather than 
of equal protection. They both read the phrase in the clause as 
though the word protection were not in it: formalists, as though the 
phrase demanded equal justice, and anti-subordinationists as though 
it demanded substantive equality. By removing the word protection 
from the phrase, they leave it a general mandate of equality and 
thus susceptible to straightforward political debate about the mean-
ing of that illusive promise. There is no question but that we need 
to debate the meaning of equality and the extent to which our com-
mitment to equality obligates us to undertake pervasive social and 
economic reordering. But equality, whether formal or substantive, 
is not the mandate of the Constitution: equal protection is. By re-
moving the promise of protection from the equal protection clause, 
our modern constitutional interpreters have taken from that phrase, 
and hence from the Amendment to which it is pivotal, its specific, 
distinctive, and constitutional contribution to political debate. For 
it is the idea of equal protection and not equality, the idea that the 
state must and should promise each citizen protection against the 
violence of others if it is truly to be a constitutional state under the 
rule of law, that is the distinctive contribution of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to our collective moral knowledge which continues to 
guide, however tenuously, our modern political choices. 
IV. THE CONSERVATIVE COURT AND CONGRESSIONAL 
RESPoNSmILITIES UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
What then might an abolitionist understanding of the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment tell us about our mod-
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ern world? The abolitionist understanding, which I have elsewhere 
called a "pure protection" model, or which might be called a "single 
sovereignty" model, primarily guarantees that every citizen will be 
subject to only one sovereign, the state. Accordingly, and minimally, 
at least according to the abolitionists and framers who advocated 
the phrase "equal protection of the law," no state shall, through 
the withdrawal of the protection of its criminal law , permit any other 
group or individual to establish a relationship of sovereignty over 
any other through the medium of unchecked violence. Also, no state, 
through the withdrawal of the protections and empowerments of its 
civil law , shall permit any group to establish sovereignty by isolating 
one group from the shared, cooperative, and competitive economic 
life of the whole, thereby exposing that group or individual to nat~ 
ural threats to survival. What, if anything, does such a vision tell 
us about modern life or our modern problems? 
First, some comments about the question itself. As James Boyd 
White has argued in his recent book, Justice As Translation,41 one 
generation cannot simply "apply" a legal formulation, no matter 
how broad, to the problems of another. Any such "application" 
requires something akin to an act of translation from one language 
to another: what we must do, when we do this sort of thing, is 
translate the message articulated in one culture, in this case pre~ and 
post~Civi1 War America, to the problems of another, late~twentieth 
century life. For that reason, any sort of pure intentionalist approach 
to the Constitution or any other legal problem, no matter how de~ 
sirable, is simply impossible; it cannot be done. But it hardly follows 
that the original understanding has no meaning, relevance, or tells 
us nothing, any more than the complexities and difficulties of trans~ 
lation render works written in another language meaningless. What 
it does mean, I think, is that both the abolitionists' overall philo~ 
sophical principles, as well as their particular agenda, might usefully 
suggest what aspects of our modern lives may be within the gambit 
of the sorts of concerns which the Fourteenth Amendment was in~ 
tended to rectify. If we can specify, to use Ronald Dworkin's helpful 
41. JAMES B. WroTE, JUSTICE As TRANSLATION (1990). 
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distinction,42 both their particular conception of equal protection and 
their general concept of the problems they were attempting to ad-
dress, we may be able to specify both the "minimal content" and 
the contested margins of a modern protectionist understanding of 
the equal protection clause. The "minimal content" will be drawn 
by analogy to the abolitionists' specific conception of equal pro-
tection and the "contested margins," by analogy to their general 
concept. 
Very baldly, at the most general or conceptual level, according 
to the abolitionists, the equal protection clause has both a negative 
and an affirmative meaning. Negatively, the clause requires that the 
state insure that every individual is equally free of all conditions 
which could potentially subjugate his will to some sovereign power 
other than the state. The clause prohibits a state of "dual sover-
eignty." The state must insure that no citizen lives under more than 
one sovereign. The clause affirmatively requires the state to protect 
each individual's positive liberty: to guarantee to every individual 
the freedom to direct his own life and work. To use the language 
of the time, the equal protection clause requires the state to affir-
matively protect each person's exercise of his natural rights or hu-
man rights. 
There were, according to the abolitionists, at least two specific 
natural rights which the state is required to protect. Those specific 
natural rights, which must be protected equally, constitute the ab-
olitionists' particular conception of equal protection. The first spe-
cific "natural right" which must be protected is the right to physical 
security. Each citizen must be protected against private violence per-
petrated against him by others. The equal protection clause guar-
antees that protection through the evenhanded application of the 
criminal law; thus, Richard Posner is right to note that, in an im-
portant sense, the wave of Klan lynchings and private violence un-
deterred and unpunished by the state that characterized the post-
Civil War era is the paradigmatic equal protection violation, not 
Jim Crow laws or segregated schools.43 
42. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1977). 
43. See Posner, supra, note 38, at 1374-75. Indeed, Congress immediately passed the Ku Klux 
Klan Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, for the express purpose of ensuring Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
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The citizen's second specific natural right is to have available to 
him the legal means to fashion a livelihood to ward off natural 
threats to survival. The equal protection clause protects against such 
threats by guaranteeing that the legal means of sustaining a liveli-
hood in a market economy through ownership, acquisition, alien-
ation, and trade of one's labor, capital, and property are available 
to all. It is important to remember that a primary immediate political 
purpose of the amendment was to ensure the constitutionality of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.44 What the equal protection clause was 
minimally designed to protect against, then, was private violence and 
material deprivation occasioned by isolation from the cooperative 
economic life of the community, through which individual liveli-
hoods could be fashioned. What then does the state have a duty to 
protect, and to protect equally? Minimally, for the abolitionists, the 
state must protect that which is absolutely essential to a free life: 
first, physical safety, and second, freedom from want - forty acres 
and a mule or its equivalent and access to the means of participation 
in the community's economic life. 
Later, I will explore possible modern ramifications of the ab-
olitionists' general concept that equal protection requires the state 
to protect our natural rights, or our positive liberty, equally. First, 
though, I want to urge that even from this minimalist, specific con-
ception of equal protection, it is not hard to see some modern viol-
ations of the equal protection mandate as understood by the 
abolitionists who argued for it. Let me briefly mention four. The 
first two derive from the state's obligation to protect against private 
violence, and the second two from its obligation to protect against 
natural threats to survival. 
First, as I have argued at length elsewhere,4s the marital rape 
exemption still in force, albeit in an attenuated form, in several 
states46 constitutes as literal a modern withdrawal of the states' pro-
44. 14 Stat. 27. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was later re-enacted after passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as Section 18 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140. See generally, TBNBROBK, 
supra note 5, at 202-03. 
45. Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 42 U. FLA. L. REv. 45 (1990). 
46. Id. at 46-48. 
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tection against violent assault as did the states' failure to protect 
against murder during the heyday of Klan violence. The conse-
quences are also not dissimilar. A woman who can be forcibly and 
physically intruded upon without recourse to legal protection or rem-
edy is not a victim of crime, with the remedies and rights pertinent 
thereto; rather, she is, and will most likely regard herself, as subject 
to the sovereign whim of he who can, without fear of state reprisal, 
coerce her consent through legitimate threats of force and violence. 
Such a woman, unlike unmarried women and unlike all men, lives 
under the will of two sovereigns rather than one: the state and her 
husband against whose violence there is no recourse. Consequently, 
the husband's commands must be obeyed if violence is to be avoided. 
The marital rape "exemption" is in a very literal sense a denial of 
the state's promise of protection against violent assault and, as such, 
given an abolitionist understanding of the phrase, is clearly and un-
pro blematically unconstitutional. 
Second, the reluctance, delay, or outright refusal of some urban 
police forces to enter high crime neighborhoods47 similarly consti-
tutes a literal withdrawal of the state's protection against violence, 
and hence this too is a violation of the guarantee of equal protection. 
Again, this withdrawal of police protection leaves large numbers of 
citizens subject to the authority of two sovereigns rather than just 
one: the state, against whose legitimate forms of violence there is 
no recourse, and the crime lord or drug lord, against whose ille-
gitimate but undeterred violence there is similarly no recourse. Dras-
tically unequal police protection quite directly implies drastically 
unequal protection of the laws, drastically unequal sufferance of 
private violence, and drastically unequal subjection or enslavement 
to the whims, will, desires, and manipUlations of one's fellow cit-
izens. 
From these two examples and the premise on which they rest -
that the state's protection against private violence is the central, 
minimal guarantee of the equal protection clause - it follows that 
47. See Elizabeth Ross, Big City Police Fall Back on Storied Concept, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
May 20, 1991, at 9; Nathan McCall, School Incumbents Under Siege, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1990, 
at J1. 
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a number of the Court's recent decisions, whether grounded in the 
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause or not, are wrong, 
or, if not wrong in their outcome, wrong in some aspect of their 
reasoning. The major premise of the Court's recent decision in 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,48 
and the sizeable number of similar cases that followed and preceded 
it,49 that there is no constitutional right to a police force,so is squarely 
wrong. The right to a police force, or, more specifically, the right 
to the state's protection against the subjugating effects of private 
violence, are the paradigm Fourteenth Amendment rights. It is pre-
cisely these rights which make us "equal" in the eyes of the law. 
Given our right to police protection against private violence, we are 
equally subject to the comm.ands of only one sovereign, the rule of 
law, and given that right we are equally free because we are equally 
free of subjection to the commands of any other. It follows that 
little Joshua DeShaney, brutally, repeatedly, and privately assaulted 
by his father, suffering massive and permanent brain damage as a 
result, did indeed suffer a constitutional violation. This violation 
was not because the state had sufficiently intervened into the family's 
life so as to satisfy the state action requirement as (indirectly) argued 
by the dissentS! but, rather, because it did not intervene enough. 
Through its inaction, not its action, the state failed to provide equal 
protection of the law. '" 
The background inequality that gave rise to the Court's decision 
three years ago in McCleskey v. KempS2 (the statistical likelihood 
that the murder of a white victim will result in a greater punishment 
than the murder of a black victim, as well as the related and similar 
devaluing of black rape victims over white rape victims reflected in 
the prosecution and punishment of rape) also has constitutional di-
mensions, although not necessarily those litigated in the case itself. S3 
48. 489 u.s. 189 (1989). 
49. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980). 
50. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197. 
51. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 208-10. 
52. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
53. See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme 
Court, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1388 (1988). 
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The relative withdrawal of protection, and correlatively greater vul-
nerability to violence reflected in that differential, again is a literal 
denial of the equal protection of the criminal law against private 
violence. Similarly, the background conditions that gave rise to 
Washington v. Davis54 - an insufficiently integrated police force in 
a nearly all-black city, where the "neutral" criteria by which black 
applicants were excluded from the force were unrelated to job per-
formance - also raises at least a suspicion, if not a presumption, 
of a denial of equal protection of the law. 55 A too-white force in 
a nearly all black town, one might hypothesize, will very likely pro-
vide a police service so far removed from the felt needs and interests 
of those served as to constitute a denial of the police protection 
against violence which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. 
It also follows from the abolitionists' minimalist understanding 
of equal protection that the so-called "state action" requirement, 
at least as presently understood by the Court, and according to some 
of its various definitions, is drastically misconceived. The equal pro-
tection clause, under an abolitionist interpretation, targets states' 
refusal to protect citizens against profoundly private action which 
results in insubordination or enslavement. The "state action," then, 
which is the object of the Amendment, is the breach of an affir-
mative duty to protect the rights of citizens to be free, minimally, 
of the subordinating, enslaving violence of other citizens. The act 
of "discrimination" that triggers equal protection analysis is the 
private violence and violating act which, unremedied and untouched 
by state law, creates a private sovereignty, separate from state sov-
ereignty forbidden by the equal protection clause. The state breach 
that constitutes the violation may take the form either of action or 
inaction, feasance or malfeasance: the state may simply fail to pro-
tect one group from the violence of others (as in the case of un-
punished and undeterred Klan or domestic violence), or the state 
may do something far more visible, such as pass legislation explicitly 
removing one group from the reach of the state's protection against 
the violence of others (such as in the case of marital rape exemption 
54. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
55. See TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1520-21. 
HeinOnline -- 94 W. Va. L. Rev. 144 1991-1992
144 WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 94 
laws). Whether the state's failure to protect constitutes an action or 
inaction, however, is not determinative. What is determinative are 
the consequences of the state's conduct: whether by virtue of the 
state's action or inaction there exists a separate state of sovereignty 
in which one citizen is subjected to the will of another citizen as 
well as to the sovereignty of the state. 
Are there other private actions, beyond physical violence, that 
have the effect of enslaving one group of citizens to another? Put 
differently, are there other natural rights beyond the right to be free 
of private violence that the state has a duty to protect? Although 
the Supreme Court ultimately confused and aborted the iS,sue in the 
Slaughterhouse CasesS6 and the Civil Rights Act Cases,S7 the framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment unambiguously believed there were 
such rights: the 1870's Civil Rights Acts, largely constitutionalized 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, sought to ensure that the state would 
protect all citizens not only from private violence, but also from 
the economic isolation, deprivation, dependence, and ultimate ec-
onomic subjugation that would inevitably result from the withdrawal 
of the state's private law. The latter goal was no less important than 
protecting citizens from the direct physical subjugation resulting from 
the withdrawal of the protection of the state's criminal law. Ar-
guably, we must stretch a little farther to find modern analogies to 
this second but equally central purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. But here as well, I think, analogous modern situations do 
exist, particularly if we do not read back into the Civil Rights Act, 
and the Amendment that was intended to constitutionalize it, mod-
ern conceptions of equal protection. 
The abolitionists and at least some of the framers of the Amend-
ment argued that the states have a duty to ensure equal access to 
the mechanisms of private law, but the reason for that obligation 
was not simply a concern for the symmetries of abstract justice. 
Rather, the state's duty arises because it is by using those mechan-
isms of contract and property law that a livelihood can be main-
tained, and the utter dependence upon others and the state of 
56. 83 U.s. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
57. 109 U.s. 3 (1883). 
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subjection to which that dependency leads can be avoided.58 It is 
easier to see modern analogues if we generalize the multiple purposes 
and ambitions of the original Civil Rights Act in this way: the states 
have a duty to protect the natural rights of the citizen to engage in 
the economic life of the community through the purchase, sale, and 
ownership of property and in one's own labor, thus ensuring liberty 
by avoiding the dependency that results from deprivation. Let me 
just mention two possible modern applications of this duty, although 
surely the list could be longer. 
First, an abolitionist understanding of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides at least some support for the claim that the equal 
protection clause guarantees minimal welfare rights, not only to shel-
ter, food, and clothing, but also to a liveable minimum income or 
job. Furthermore, an abolitionist approach clarifies what an anti-
subordinationist approach toward the same conclusion obfuscates: 
the source of the right to welfare, if there is one, is not in the 
Amendment's avowal of equality, for there is none, but rather, its 
promise of protection.59 Simply put, the state has an obligation to 
protect citizens from abject subjection to the whims of others oc-
casioned by extreme states of poverty, no less than to protect citizens 
from vulnerability to the threats of physical violence from others. 
Indeed, chronic, multi-generational homelessness, for example, shares 
in many, although certainly not all, of the features of post-slave life 
that not only prompted the passage of, but also framed the meaning 
of, the Amendment: for both the nineteenth-century freed slave and 
the twentieth-century homeless person, the total dispossession of 
property which defines the condition of the latter, and which was 
a central feature of the condition of the former, entails a similar 
lack of privacy, an inability to manage one's own life, a dependency 
upon others for material survival, the difficulty or impossibility of 
selling one's own labor, and ultimately the impossibility or near 
impossibility of ever achieving the state of self sovereignty, rather 
58. See TENBROEK, supra note 5. 
59. Cf. Frank 1. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 659, 677-78, 178 (arguing that welfare, not equality, is behind the Warren Court's Equal Pro-
tection cases dealing with poor people). . 
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than subjection to others, which is the underlying goal of the re-
construction amendments taken in their entirety. 
This abolitionist, "pure protection," or "single sovereignty," 
understanding of the equal protection clause also provides a way of 
thinking about the constitutionality of the so-called "traditional" 
division of labor in the most private of private spheres: the home. 
As numerous feminist writers from various disciplines have pointed 
out,60 the vast numbers of women who perform huge and dispro-
portionate amounts of unpaid domestic labor, from childcare to 
housekeeping, often preventing their acquisition or development of 
labor skills compensable in the "real" or paid labor market, are, 
like slaves, rendered subject to the whim of a separate sovereign, 
the check-bearing spouse upon whom they depend for material sur-
vival. Whether viewed through the lens of the direct prohibition of 
slavery provided in the Thirteenth Amendment, or through the lens 
of the equal protection mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
state has failed to protect these women against the resulting state 
of servitude. The state has failed to ensure that no group of citizens 
lives under the mastery of two sovereigns rather than only under 
the mastery of state sovereignty. The state has failed to provide equal 
protection of the law. 
The abolitionist history of the passage of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment might then leave us with this 
minimal formulation: we have an absolute, incontrovertible right not 
to be subject to any sovereignty other than the state. From this 
absolute right are derived subsidiary rights and obligations: we have 
a right to be free of those conditions which, if unchecked by the 
state, generate separate sovereignties, including, at least, a right to 
be free of private violence and extreme material deprivation. Both 
unchecked private violence and material deprivation engender de-
pendency upon others and subjection to their whims, desires, and 
commands, which is constitutive of the state of slavery. Correla-
tively, the state has an affirmative duty to protect our natural rights 
to physical security and economic participation. If the state fails to 
60. See, e.g., ARLIE HocHscHILD, THE SECOND SmFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THB REVOLUTION 
AT HOME (1989). 
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grant or extend that protection to some subgroup of the community, 
it has failed to grant equal protection of the laws. 
Finally, and still from just this minimalist "sole sovereignty" 
interpretation of equal protection, we can generate answers to the 
three modern dilemmas of Fourteenth Amendment law that have so 
badly split the constitutional community into its formalist and anti-
subordinationist camps. First, the very general mandate of integra-
tion and the prohibition against state-sponsored segregation that is 
articulated, albeit ambiguously, in Brown61 is supportable under a 
protectionist, no less than formalist or anti-subordinationist, ap-
proach although the reason is somewhat different: where either pri-
vate or state-sponsored segregation subjugates one class of citizens 
to the sovereignty of another class, and where the state acquiesces 
in that subjugation, the state has violated its promise of equal pro-
tection. It could surely be argued that radically unequal state seg-
regated public schools had both that intent and effect. Second, where 
a state law, rule, or criterion adversely impacts the interests of one 
class of citizens, whether or not intentionally, and that adverse im-
pact has the effect of subjugating one class of citizens to the will 
of another, the equal protection clause is violated. The use of neutral 
criterion in Washington v. Davis62 to exclude blacks from the city's 
police force mayor may not be such a violation, depending on the 
effects and history of non-black police forces in nearly all-black 
cities. If a too-white force is incapable of providing protection to 
a black community, then the unprotected citizen is effectively sub-
jected to the sovereignty of both the state and the unchecked will 
of the local crime or drug lord. If so, then Washington v. Davis is 
a quite literal denial of equal protection of the law. 
And third, under a "protectionist" or "sole sovereignty" un-
derstanding of equal protection, affirmative action of the sort ruled 
impermissible in Croson63 is clearly permitted because the color con-
sciousness that is intrinsic to affirmative action is not intended to 
nor does it have the effect of SUbjugating whites to the command 
61. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
62. 426 u.s. 229 (1976). 
63. 488 u.s. 469 (1989). 
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of blacks, and is constitutionally required wherever the failure to 
undertake affirmative action would perpetuate the continuing sub-
jugation of the freedom of blacks to the will of whites. From the 
perspective of the problems which ou~ formalist-anti-subordination-
ist debate has highlighted, then, a "protectionist" approach is some-
where between the two poles. A protectionist approach is more 
permissive of affirmative action than a formalist approach: for the 
formalist, any race consciousness is irrational and therefore uncon-
stitutional, while for the protectionist, race consciousness is only 
unconstitutional if it is part of a pattern of sUbjugation that elevates 
one class of citizens to a state of virtual sovereignty over another. 
On the other hand, a protectionist approach is less demanding than 
an anti-subordinationist approach: while the anti-subordinationist 
reads the Amendment as requiring a very broad egalitarianism, the 
protectionist reads it as requiring liberty, and while the anti-sub-
ordinationist targets subordinating conditions as constitutional viol-
ations, the protectionist targets only those subordinating conditions 
that are so extreme as to confer upon one group a sovereign status, 
and upon the other, a correlative denial of freedom. 
If this is the "minimal content of the equal protection clause," 
what are its outer reaches, as understood by the abolitionists? What, 
to return to Dworkin's fruitful formulation, is implied by the very 
general concept of equal protection they advocated rather that the 
particular conception of it they urged, that is, freedom from separate 
sovereignties and a right to be protected against the subordinating 
effects of private violence, economic isolation, and material dep-
rivation? What should be, or what might be, our modern conception 
of equal protection if we are to remain true to the general concept 
intended by the abolitionists? At the very concrete level, and the 
protestations of intentionalist constitutionalists notwithstanding, his-
tory can provide little guidance, as it has been the burden of the 
constitutional interpretivists, pragmatists, and other anti-intention-
alists to demonstrate.64 Nevertheless, the abolitionists' very general 
understanding of constitutionalism, of politics and, in brief, their 
64. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REv. 204 (1980); DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 131-50. 
HeinOnline -- 94 W. Va. L. Rev. 149 1991-1992
1991] ABOLITIONIST INTERPRETATION 149 
moral philosophy, does at least suggest a way to ask the question 
that brings into focus modern problems and modern solutions. Their 
formulation of the relevant questions also reveals, however, at least 
three reasons why the abolitionist understanding never dominated 
judicial interpretation of the clause during the twentieth-century: it 
rested upon a way of thinking about natural rights that is dra-
matically at odds with modern modes of thought; it rested on a 
moral and social vision largely unamenable to judicial enactment; 
and finally, it rested on and presupposed a sense of civic respon-
sibility and obligation to others that is foreign to our modern con-
ception of citizenship. Let me suggest what the abolitionists' general 
concept required and then explore the obstacles to its modern re-
alization. 
To know what the equal protection of the law requires under 
an abolitionist understanding of the phrase, we need to know what 
is meant by our very general right not to be subjugated to the com-
mands of any non-state sovereign, or, put affirmatively, our right 
to be free. A right not to be subjugated to the whims of a sovereign 
other than the state rests on (or implies, or simply restates) a positive 
right to be free of bondage. The Fourteenth Amendment, then, might 
profitably be viewed as a sort of charter of positive liberty or a 
charter protecting our right to be self-governing, autonomous, free 
of other rulers, masters, or superiors, within the confines of the rule 
of law. As the abolitionists themselves realized, such a guarantee 
requires for its full enunciation and realization a theory of natural 
rights and some sort of teleological account of human nature. What 
does it mean to be free? What, beyond physical and material se-
curity, must be protected if we are to be truly free? What needs 
must be met? What wants satisfied? What is so central to our human 
essence that only if it is protected, nurtured, or furthered, can we 
be called free? The central question, then, posed by the original 
understanding of the equal protection guarantee, is what natural 
rights do we possess, and possess equally, that must be protected 
if we are to enjoy the equal protection of the law, and hence enjoy 
the liberty which is its fundamental promise? 
If we could answer that question, if we could specify the natural 
rights we each hold in the contemporary world, we would know the 
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current reach of the abolitionist understanding of the equal pro-
tection clause. Do we have, for example, a natural right to edu-
cation, for the distinctively abolitionist reason that only with an 
education do we have any hope of self-sufficiency, independence, 
or self-sovereignty? Is participation in culture and the world of 
knowledge so central to our humanity that unless that potential is 
protected and nurtured, we are not, in some important sense, truly 
free, but are rather enslaved by ignorance? The compulsive insistence 
by whites on maintaining the illiteracy and ignorance of slaves in 
the pre-Civil War south is some negative evidence, of course, that 
education is indeed essential to self-sovereignty or positive liberty 
- that it is, in short, a natural right. Might not pregnant women 
have a right to obtain an abortion for an unwanted pregnancy for 
the distinctively abolitionist reason that without such a right, the 
woman is enslaved against her wishes to not only the pregnancy, 
but also, very likely, at least for a large portion of her life, to the 
unwanted and unpaid labor that unwanted motherhood entails? Is 
power over one's body and one's reproductivity, as well as choice 
of one's life work, so central to human identity, that without those 
powers and choices protected, we are in some sense unfree? Might 
not gay men and lesbians have a right to state laws which protect 
their intimate and sexual orientations equally as those of hetero-
sexuals, for the distinctively abolitionist reason that such choices and 
orientations are a necessary part of a free life, and without such 
protection, t4e individual is subjugated to the whims and desires of 
an unchecked and heterosexist cultural mandate? Might not members 
of distinctive cultural subgroups, such as Native Americans, Spanish-
speaking Americans, or the Amish, have a right to state laws that 
protect the integrity and cohesiveness of their culture, for the dis-
tinctively abolitionist reason that identification with such a group 
is for many an essential part of a free life, and without such pro-
tection, they are subjugated to the mandatory mores of an un-
checked, hostile, and hegemonic majority culture? These are difficult 
questions for which I do not have answers. To answer them requires 
a normative account of human nature: who are we, who should we 
be, what does it mean to be human, what might it mean to be free? 
On the other side of the coin, an abolitionist concept of equal 
protection requires a teleological and normative account of sover-
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eignty. What natural duties does the state owe its citizens, by virtue 
of its, and their, allegiance to the notion of a rule of law and their 
shared commitment to the state's sole sovereignty? Against what 
evils must the state provide protection if each citizen is to be free? 
The abolitionist held that the state must provide protection against 
private violence and economic isolation, but this is clearly not the 
only possible response. Must it also protect, for example, against 
the disappearance of subcultures? Must the state protect against 
mandatory and unpaid childbirth? Must it protect against that in-
stitution that Adrienne Rich provocatively calls "compulsory 
heterosexuality"65 - compulsory, not only because its mandates are 
as often as not backed by violent sanctions, but also because it is 
falsely presented as necessary, natural, and as part of the inevitable 
order of things? Against what private, natural, or cultural con-
straints on our positive liberty, our right to be self-governing, our 
right to be free of nonstate sovereign entities, does the state have 
a duty to protect us? 
These too are difficult questions which I will not here attempt 
an answer. I do though want to notice one feature shared by all of 
them. Answers to these questions I submit about the duties of the 
state to provide equal protection to its citizens in a constitutional 
democracy in which "the state" is in some sense us, requires not 
just a view of human nature, and not just an understanding of our 
natural rights, but also a deep appreciation of our civic obligations, 
our natural commitments to others, and our shared responsibility 
for their well-being. For to ask, in this culture, what "the state" 
must protect or whether "the state" must protect against violence, 
hunger, heterosexual oppression, and cultural annihilation is not to 
ask what some other entity, a distant monarch or legislature, must 
do to protect the weak, but what each of us must do to protect 
each other as well as to protect ourselves. If protection against sub-
jugating conditions is the essence of the equal protection clause, and 
if we are serious about understanding our state and ourselves as a 
constitutional democracy, if we are the "sovereign," then that clause 
65. Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and the Lesbian Continuum, in BLOOD, BREAD 
AND POETRY (1986). 
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is incontrovertibly about our obligations to protect each other, not 
simply our right to protection from a reified state. In their political 
activities, the abolitionists proclaimed themselves to be, and in fact 
became, their brothers' keepers. In their victorious insistence on equal 
protection of the law for all, they constitutionalized the obligation 
as well as the right. Through the mandate of equal protection, the 
insistence that we the people protect each other against the private 
subordination of some by others, the Constitution became not just 
a charter of rights but a charter of citizen responsibilities. 
If all of this is right, then it is not hard to see several reasons 
why the abolitionist understanding of equal protection has not flour-
ished in this century and what we need to do if we are to take the 
abolitionist interpretation seriously. The first reason has to do with 
current mores of intellectual thought. Substantive, normative, and 
teleological theories of natural rights, the philosophical underpinning 
of the abolitionist's constitutional theory, simply do not resonate 
with our modern ways of thinking about political morality. The 
conceit in contemporary political thought, buttressed by ambitions 
of scientism as well as fashions of post-modernism, is that we either 
should or must dispense with theories of nature, human nature, and 
natural rights in political thought. Relatedly, most (but certainly not 
all) modern political and constitutional thinkers view the citizen's 
possession of rights, not his possession of responsibilities, as of the 
essence of constitutionalism. For both reasons, the abolitionists' claim 
that each of us collectively and individually is constitutionally ob-
ligated to protect the natural rights or the central humanity of each 
other to guarantee each others' freedom does not rest easily with 
twentieth century political and moral theory. 
The third reason that even a minimalist version of the abolitionist 
interpretation may not have prevailed is structural. As the Court 
has always been quick to point out, the federal judiciary is ill 
equipped to remedy the structural, institutional, and social ine-
qualities, practices, and attitudes that result in constitutionally prob-
lematic states of affairs, such as unequal sentences for killers of 
white victims and black victims, or the unequal participation of blacks 
on the Washington, D.C. police force. The federal judiciary is sim-
ilarly ill equipped to fashion the massive restructuring of our market 
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economy that would be necessary to end the millennium-long era 
of unpaid domestic labor and the subsequent undervaluing of wom-
en's work in the market economy. The judiciary could, of course, 
do some things: it could easily declare marital rape laws unconsti-
tutional; it could reverse itself and affirm our right to protection 
by a police force; and it could insist that the state compensate victims 
of violence such as Joshua DeShaney, who are now denied that 
protection. But it could do little or nothing to redirect our com-
munity resources so as to guarantee the funds necessary to mean-
ingfully effectuate that promise, to actually create the programs 
needed to deter domestic violence, to provide additional support for 
police forces assigned to high-crime neighborhoods, or to insure that 
the social services agencies charged with protecting Joshua DeShaney 
would become a reality for the community at large, rather than for 
the rare individual who can marshall the funds and fortitude to file 
a law suit. The conservative Court and conservative theorists are 
probably right to insist that the re-ordering of priorities and re-
directing of collective resources necessary to make these programs 
a reality must originate with legislative, not judicial action. They 
are wrong, though, to imply from that structural limit the non-
existence of the background constitutional right. 
The last obstacle I want to mention to modern implementation 
of interpretation of the equal protection clause is jurisprudential: it 
concerns the nature of the "law" discovered or created by courts, 
as contrasted with the nature of "law" created by legislative process. 
Here, a quick contrast with the formal equality model presently 
adopted by the current Supreme Court is helpful. To determine 
whether or not a statute violates the equal protection clause under 
the formal equality model, the Court must essentially deCide whether 
the legislature is "treating like groups alike." Whatever may be the 
shortcomings of this model, and I think there are many, it has one 
unassailable strength: the formal equality model of equal protection 
that requires rational categorization in legislation demands of the 
Court what might be called "adjudicative virtues." The work re-
quired of the Courts under the formal equality model in deciding 
whether a rule treats like cases alike converges perfectly with the 
essential core of the judicial task. Deciding whether a precedent or 
a rule treats like cases alike is what courts do all the time, and, 
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moreover, it is what courts should do all the time. To do this well, 
to decide whether rules and decisions are rational in precisely this 
way, is the mark of a good judge. The rationality and the conception 
of formal justice on which it depends, and which is the central 
demand of the formal equality model, is itself an "adjudicative vir-
tue": to treat like cases alike is the ideal of good judging toward 
which judges aspire. It is not at all surprising that judges gravitate 
toward an understanding of the equal protection clause that in turn 
rests on an understanding of equality that in turn requires of them 
the exercise of precisely this familiar virtue. 
By contrast, the general concept of equal protection advanced 
by the abolitionists (as well as modern anti-subordinationists) re-
quires the exercise not of this adjudicative virtue but of citizen and 
legislative virtues. To know what the equal protection clause requires 
us to protect, and what it requires us to protect against, requires 
a view, articulated or not, widely accepted or not, debated and de-
batable or not, of the content of liberty, of human nature, of natural 
rights, and, given our commitment to democracy, of human and 
citizen obligation. We need to know who we are and how we should 
distribute our collective resources: what we owe to whom. It ulti-
mately demands a theory of distributive, not equal or formal, jus-
tice. These distributive and redistributive questions may not be 
questions that judges can or should answer. They are precisely the 
questions, however, we need to ask of ourselves and of our rep-
resentatives. 
If we are to make sense of the equal protection clause as un-
derstood by the abolitionists, and as understood by at least many 
of its framers, we need to do two things. We need to reacquaint 
ourselves with old ways of thinking about our human nature and 
the natural rights that follow. We need to suspend our post-mod-
ernist doubts that this is a sensible and fruitful way to think about 
political morality. Secondly, and to my mind of greater importance, 
if we are to take seriously the view of the equal protection clause 
intended by its framers and advocates, we need to quit asking what 
that clause requires of our courts, what it directs our judges to do 
or refrain from doing, and how much of its vision is compatible 
with judicial review - whether it does or does not accord with our 
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tripartite common-sensical conception of individual rights, majority 
rule, and judicial role. We need to ask instead what the clause de-
mands of us as legislators, as citizens, as lawmakers, and as members 
of a community. When we ask what we are required to do to guar-
antee to each of us the equal protection of the law, rather than 
what judges are required to do, we may see very different answers. 
The answers to that question urged by the abolitionists well over a 
century ago, to which we may have blinded ourselves through our 
peculiarly modern intellectual focus on equality and rights rather 
than equal protection and responsibility and our peculiarly historic 
insistence on judicial enforcement rather than the congressional en-
forcement called for by the Amendment itself, may be more pro-
gressive, more astute, more just, and more caring than either the 
colorblind or egalitarian charter of equality that we currently read 
into the clause, and which has stalemated debate and stalled our 
constitutional, as well as moral, progress. 
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